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consideration of the decreased purchasing power of the dollar is thus
greatly larger in proportion to other verdicts in similar cases than the
increased cost of living would seem to justify.29
ROBERT G. STOCKTON.
Domestic Relations-Parent and Child-Support of
Incompetent Adult
Plaintiff, wife of the defendant, brought suit against him to recover
the value of necessaries and necessary services furnished by her to their
adult son. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant husband had separated
himself from his family, that the son continued to live with the plaintiff,
his mother, before reaching majority and thereafter, and that before
and after attaining majority he was insolvent, unmarried, and so men-
tally and physically handicapped as to be incapable of supporting him-
self. On demurrer, held: a good cause of action was stated.'
Under the English and earlier American view, the parent's obliga-
tion to support his minor child was a moral one only.2  The prevailing
view in this country now, however, is that there is a legal as well as
moral duty of support resting on the parent.3 While the common law
duty is widely recognized, the basis and reasoning upon which it has
been founded have varied greatly. Some courts have imposed the duty
of support as a reciprocal of the parent's right to the custody, control
and earnings of the minor child ;4 others have found a basis in the in-
"9 The fact that on a previous trial of this same case, reversed on appeal, the
jury awarded only $100,000 would also point to the conclusion that an award of
$160,000 was excessive.
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
'Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 481 (Exch. 1841); Shelton v. Springett, 11
C. B. 452 (1851); Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187 (1870); Freeman v. Robinson,
38 N. J. L. 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399 (1876).
3 1 ScnouzLER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §787 (6th ed. 1921); MADDEN, PERSONS
AND DOMESTIC RELATiONS §110 (1931).
The North Carolina court early recognized a legal duty on the father to main-
tain his children, even when they had separate estates of their own. Walker v.
Crowder, 37 N. C. 478 (1843) ; Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N. C. 345 (1872). The
duty is not an absolute one, however. It is qualified by the parent's ability.
Casualty Co. v. Lawing, 225 N. C. 103, 33 S. E. 2d 609 (1945).
The duty of support is limited to necessaries, what constitutes necessaries
varying with the circumstances of the particular case. The liability is enforced
under several principles: an agency implied in law, an agency implied in fact,
or quasi-contract, the North Carolina court adopting the latter. See Howell v.
Solomon, 167 N. C. 588, 592, 83 S. E. 619, 621 (1914).
The duty of support is now generally covered by criminal statutes also. See
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§14-322 through 14-325..
' Central Asylum v. Knighton, 113 Ky. 156, 67 S. W. 366 (1902) ; Dedham v.
Natick, 16 Mass. 140 (1819); Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 729
(1895); Butler v. Commonvealth, 132 Va. 609, 110 S. E. 868 (1922). Right to
custody and earnings does not form a satisfactory basis for the duty, however,
since the duty of support must still remain on the father even though custody of the
child has been awarded the mother or third persons. Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md.
254, 67 Atl. 132 (1907); see Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490,
491 (1914).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ability of the child to care for himself 5 and the state's interest as parens
patriae.0 The state's concern in preventing the child from becoming a
pauper and a charge upon the taxpayer is said by some to warrant the
imposition of the duty;7 and still others, including the North Carolina
court, have taken the view that the obligation springs from the natural
relationship of parent to child, a responsibility arising from the fact
of parenthood alone.8
Having recognized the existence of the legal duty owed by parent
to child, the North Carolina court has not confined enforcement of the
duty to actions by third parties who have furnished necessaries, or to
divorce decrees or criminal actions. Instead, a progressive attitude has
been taken; the obligation has been directly sanctioned by allowing the
child himself to proceed directly against the parent.0 Such direct en-
forcement would seem to be equally available to illegitimate children.
against the putative father.1
The common law duty of support owed to the child ordinarily termi-
nates (1) upon the attainment of majority,11 (2) when there has other-
wise been an emancipation, 12 or (3) upon the death of either parent or
'Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W. 295 (1890); Doughty v. Engler,
112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S. E.
426 (1938).2Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N. W. 778 (1918).
' Willitts v. Willitts, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379 (1916).
'Barritt v. Barritt, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934); Doughty v. Engler,
112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; Buckminster v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 248, 88 Am.
Dec. 652 (1865). "The duty of parents to provide for the naintenance of their
children is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf, (b) laid on
them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them
into the world ... ." 1 CooLEY's BLACXSTONE 446 (3rd ed. 1884).
Thayer v. Thayer, .189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E. 553 (1925) (natural obligation to
support illegitimate children is sufficient consideration to uphold express promise
to furnish necessaries) ; Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C. 317, 83 S. E. 490 (1914)
(legal, natural and moral duty to support minor children irrespective of loss of
custody); Burton v. Belvin, 142 N. C. 153, 55 S. E. 71 (1906) (father under
natural obligation to support illegitimate children) ; Kimbrough v. Davis, 16 N. C.
71 (1827) (natural duty of support extends to illegitimates).
Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936); Note, 15 N. C. L. Rv.
67 (1936) ; Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N. C. 779, 188 S. E. 313 (1936).
The weight of authority, however, is apparently contra. Rawlings v. Rawlings,
121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146 (1919) ; Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (1891) ; Glaze
v. Hart, 225 Mo. App. 1205, 36 S. W. 2d 684 (1931) ; Allings v. Allings, 52 N. J.
Eq. 92, 97 Atl. 655 (1893).
"o Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; cf. Hyatt v. McCoy,
195 N. C. 762, 143 S. E. 518 (1928) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E.
553 (1925) ; see Burton v. Belvin, 142 N. C. 151, 153, 55 S. E. 71, 72 (1906)
Kimbrough v. Davis, 16 N. C. 71, 75 (1827).
Humboldt County v. Beigger, 232 Iowa 494, 4 N. E. 2d 422 (1942) ; Breuer
v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S. W. 541 (1925); Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135
Al. 841 (1927); Brown v. Ramsay, 29 N. J. L. 117 (1860); re Beilstein, 145
Ohio St. 397, 62 N. E. 2d 205 (1945) ; Lind v. Zeisel, 159 N. E. 849 (Ohio App.
1927).
2Emancipation may be either partial or complete; but it is only in complete
emancipation that all rights and duties of the parent-child relationship are ex-
tinguished. Note, 28 MINN. L. REv. 275 (1944). Where there has not been a
1948]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
child.13 The principal case, however, constitutes an exception to the
"majority" rule. Under the doctrine of this and supporting cases, if at
the time of attaining majority the child is mentally or physically in-
capable of self-support, the obligation upon the parent does not terminate
but continiies as long as the necessity for support exists.14 The court
recognizes that majority is a status rather than an inflexible rule of
substantive law conferring vested rights. Since the decision may not
be rationalized under the rules of emancipation, the North Carolina
court properly chose to place it upon public policy. In the final analysis,
the question becomes-shall the parent be legally bound to support his
incapacitated adult child or shall that duty devolve upon the taxpayers if
the parent chooses to ignore his moral obligation? Consistent with the
theory that parental duty springs from and is a responsibility of parent-
hood, the North Carolina court has placed the burden upon the parent.
North Carolina has no statute making parents liable to the state or
county for the maintenance furnished to adult incompetents. 15 Under
complete emancipation, i.e. where there has not been an assent by both parties, the
act or assent of one party alone cannot absolve that party of the duties upon him.
Thus in Hunycutt v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628 (1912) it was held
that the act of the father in driving his minor son from home might result in
emancipation as to the child but did not free the father of the duty of support.
Assent need not be express; it may be implied from circumstances. James v.
James,.226 N. C. 399, 38 S. E. 2d 168 (1946) ; Jolly v. Telegraph Co., 204 N. C.
136, 167 S. E. 575 (1933), reh. denied, 205 N. C. 108, 170 S. E. 145 (1933);
Lowrie v. Oxendine, 153 N. C. 267, 69 S. E. 131 (1910); Ingram v. R. R., 152
N. C. 762, 67 S. E. 926 (1910). Exceptions to the rule requiring mutual assent
for complete emancipation are marriage and enlistment in the armed services. Com-
plete emancipation occurs here because of the inconsistency of the parent-child
relationship with the new relationship entered into by the child.
" Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 Atl. 841 (1927) ; Rice v. Andrews, 217
N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926) ; Comment, 25 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1926); see Stone v.
Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 189, 134 Pac. 820, 822 (1913) (the court questioned the
termination of the common law duty by death as a matter of public policy and held
a divorce decree providing for maintenance was binding upon the father's estate).
That a father may disinherit his child and leave him to become a charge upon
the State has been severely criticized. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
§115 (1931).
" Freestate v. Freestate, 244 Ill. App. 166 (1927) ; Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky.
12, 268 S. W. 541 (1925) ; Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S. W. 67 (1908) ;
Comm. v. O'Malley, 105 Pa. Super. 232, 161 Atl. 883 (1932) ; Rowell v. Town of
Vershire, 62 Vt. 405, 19 Atl. 990 (1890) ; Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co.,
111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007 (1920); see Borchert v. Borchert, 45 A. 2d 463,
465 (Md. 1946); re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N. E. 2d 205, 207 (1945);
Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 Atl. 549, 553 (1930).
New York has apparently imposed a common law duty to support incapacitated
adult children notwithstanding that they did not become incapable of self-support
until after attaining majority. In re Van Denburgh, 178 App. Div. 237, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 966 (1917); Alger v. Miller, 56 Barb. 227 (N. Y. 1868); Cromwell v.
Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558 (N. Y. 1863).
" The duty to support adult incompetents apparently exists only as between
husband and wife in North Carolina.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §122-46 provides that' the clerk of superior court
may commit a mentally disordered, epileptic, or person addicted to the use of
drugs or alcohol to the State Hospital under a certificate of indigency where such
person has no estate or property "nor has any one such property who is liable
for his maintenance under §35-33 of the General Statutes." By §35-33 it is pro-
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the holding of the principal case, however, the state or county would
seem to have a recoverable claim, for necessaries furnished, against the
parent of any inmate of a state or county hospital or asylum when such
inmate was incapacitated upon reaching majority.16 But where the
adult child became incapacitated after having attained majority, the duty
of support, having once terminated, is not revived; and accordingly no
recovery could be had.17
In the principal case, the court, in creating the exception to the
"majority" rule, reached a result. commensurate with sound public policy
and progressive social principles. Would an extension of that exception
to include a parental duty of support embracing all incapacitated adult
children who would become a charge upon the taxpayers be desirable?
Only one state has apparently extended the common law duty of sup-
port to that extreme.' 8 The better solution seems to lie in the enactment
of so-called "poor laws." In substance these provide that the father,
mother, grandfather, grandmother or children, in that order, of any old
or incapacitated indigent person shall maintain them if of ability to do
so.19 Such a statute would seem to be consistent with North Carolina
policy as enunciated in the cases and would properly place the burden
of maintenance upon those more equitably able to bear it than the
taxpayers.
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vided that the clerk shall inquire whether the inebriate is indigent and if he so
finds he shall then inquire whether or not the petitioning wife or husband or if
the inebriate is a minor whether the parent has sufficient estate to bear the cost
of maintenance; if sufficient estate is found the clerk shall order payment there-
from; if not, payment shall be made by the county from which committed.See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§143-120 through 125.
"Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S. W. 541 (1925). But cf. Porter v.
Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W. 295 (1890) (distinguishable on the ground that
only a partial and not a complete emancipation was achieved). See Wells v.
Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 619, 44 S. E. 2d 31, 35 (1947).
" In re Van Denburgh, 179 App. Div. 237, 164 N. Y. Supp. 966 (1917) ; Alger
v. Miller, 56 Barb. 227 (N. Y. 1868); Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558
(N. Y. 1863). The matter is now covered by statute, N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW
§101, providing: "The husband, wife, father, mother, grandparent, or child- of a
recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need
thereof shall, if of sufficient ability, be responsible for the support of such
person ...
" "Poor laws" in general are patterned after 43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601).
Substantially similar statutes are found in a majority of the states. See ALA.
CODE (1940) tit. 44, §8; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §7603; CAL. CIV. CODE(Deering, 1941) §206; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 124, §1; CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) §1717; GA. CODE'ANN. (Park, 1936) §2301; IDAHo CODE (1932)§31-1002; ILL. ANN. STAT.'(Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 107, §1; IOWA CODE (1946)§252.2; ME. REV. STAT. (1944) c. 82, §20; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1942) c. 117, §6;
MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) §16.122; MINN. STAT.. (Henderson, 1941)§261.01; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942)- §7357; MONT. REv. CODE (Darlington, Supp.
1939) §4522; NEB. REv. STAT. (1943) §68-101; N. H. Rav. LAWS (1942) c. 124,
§18; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) §44:1-140; N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW §101;
N. D. 'REv. STAT. (1943) §50-0119; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) tit. 10, §12; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 62, §195; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §91-0-1; VT.
Pur. LAWS (1933) §3937; WAsn. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1933) §9982:
W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) §626(150).
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